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After entering the EU in 1986, Portugal benefited from low interest rates and some growth 
momentum. However, the difficulty in taming fiscal imbalances, the pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal policy, the use of extraordinary fiscal measures, coupled with the 2008-2009 
economic and financial crisis led to a fiscal débacle and to an international financial rescue 
in 2011. We briefly review here those developments. 
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1. Introduction 
After 1985 Portugal faced several important economic and institutional transformations 
regarding notably a deeper economic and financial integration in the European Union (EU) 
level: joined the EU in 1986, joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) in 1992, and adhered to the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) on January 1999, adopting the euro in 2002.  
In terms of public finances developments, the fiscal consolidations that occurred in the 
1980s were short-termed and mostly not successful. Indeed, Portugal was the first country 
in the EU to breach the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 2002, becoming therefore 
subject to the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), a situation that occurred again in 2005 
and in 2009. 
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Then, on April 2011, notably in the context of the global economic and financial crisis, 
and in the midst of the European sovereign debt crisis, with prohibitively rising long term 
yields, Portugal asked for the financial support of the EU and of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), signing a Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), adopting 
a programme set to last until mid-2014. 
This note offers some stylised facts and assessment of the main developments in fiscal 
policy in Portugal in the last 30 years, in particular to what extent fiscal behaviour has been 
on an unsustainable path. Mostly, the upward path in primary spending, the lack of relevant 
cyclically adjusted primary balances, coupled with pro-cyclical fiscal policies, and the wide 
use of extraordinary and one-off fiscal measures (for example, sales of non-financial assets 
and revenues resulting from the transfers of pensions to the general government), and the 
weak growth after the 200s, compounded with the capital markets turmoil, paved the way 
to the inability of autonomous sovereign long-term financing.  
This not eis organised as follows. Section two reviews developments in public finances. 
Section three offers comments on the fiscal débacle. Section four concludes. 
 
2. Stylised developments 
After the adoption of the euro, Portugal’s business cycle became more synchronized 
with the euro area business cycle, as one would expect. Indeed, business cycle 
synchronization increased from 0.265 in the period 1993-1998 to 0.793 in the period 1999-
2009. 1 On the other hand, and contrarily to several other more exported oriented economies 
in the euro area (for instance, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, and Ireland) in Portugal 
the share of private consumption in GDP increased from 63.6% in the period 1993-1998 to 
65.2% in the period 1999-2009. In addition, and regarding some changing composition in 
the components of GDP, per sector, one observed also the diminishing relevance of the 
share of the primary sector activities in GDP, following notably some EU incentives in that 
direction after the entrance in the EU. 
                                                            
1 Synchronization is measured on the basis of correlation coefficients between the cyclical component of real 
GDP in Portugal and the cyclical component of real GDP in the euro area (HP filter), see Afonso and 
Sequeira (2010). 
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2.1. Public finances’ developments 
Portugal was one of the countries that gained the most from the decrease in interest 
rates, given the high interest rate levels that it incurred in the past. For instance, between 
1986 and 2004, the implicit interest rate in the stock of government debt decreased around 
9 percentage points (see Figure 1), after have peaked in 1992, and that could have been 
used to implement sustained fiscal consolidations, but basically that was never fully 
pursued. 
 

























































































Source: European Commission, AMECO, October 2012. Own calculations for the implicit interest 
rate, which is Interest payments/Government debt *100. 
 
Indeed, public primary expenditure in Portugal has been trending upwards since the late 
1980s, after the adhesion to the EU (see Figure 2). Indeed, primary expenditure averaged 
23.5%, 31.6%, 35.7%, and 42% of GDP respectively in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 
2000s. This contrasts with the developments observed on average in the EU, where the 
government spending-to-GDP ratio remained more stable. 
Another worrisome conclusion (see Figure 3) is the existence of high budget balance 
deficits and rather inexistent primary surpluses in the last decades.2 Indeed, the budget 
deficit in the period 1974-2012 was below 3% of GDP only in two years, 1989 and 1999, 
                                                            
2 See Guichard and Leibfritz (2006), Pina (2004), and Cunha and Braz (2009) for assessments of the pitfalls 
in past fiscal policy developments in Portugal. See also OECD (2012) for a recent analysis. 
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with average budget balances of -6.9%, -5.0%, -4.8%t of GDP respectively in the 1980s, 
1990s, and 2000s. In such context, it was not surprising that two distinct stylized events, 
but naturally connected, occurred. First, the fact that the few fiscal consolidations that took 
place in the period 1970-2012 were mostly short lived. Second, the recurrent Excessive 
Deficit Procedures opened for Portugal after 2001 (three in total).  
 
































































 Source: European Commission, AMECO, October 2012. 
 
Another worrisome conclusion (see Figure 3) is the existence of high budget balance 
deficits and rather inexistent primary surpluses in the last decades.3 Indeed, the budget 
deficit in the period 1974-2012 was below 3% of GDP only in two years, 1989 and 1999, 
with average budget balances of -6.9%, -5.0%, -4.8%t of GDP respectively in the 1980s, 
1990s, and 2000s. In such context, it was not surprising that two distinct stylized events, 
but naturally connected, occurred. First, the fact that the few fiscal consolidations that took 
place in the period 1970-2012 were mostly short lived. Second, the recurrent Excessive 
Deficit Procedures opened for Portugal after 2001 (three in total).  
More specifically, we can observe in the 1990s and in the 2000s a higher spending-to-
GDP ratio in terms of the compensation of public employees, vis-à-vis the EU15 average. 
                                                            
3 See Guichard and Leibfritz (2006), Pina (2004), and Cunha and Braz (2009) for assessments of the pitfalls 
in past fiscal policy developments in Portugal. See also OECD (2012) for a recent analysis. 
 5 
That ratio in Portugal trended upwards after 1986, and stayed above the EU15 average all 
through the 1990s, being only reversed after 2005 (see Figure 4). However, part of the 
reversion in 2003 is due to the fact that several hospitals were given the status of 
enterprises, and exited the general government sector, implying the reduction in the number 
of employees and in the overall wage bill. 
 


















































































































































































































































Budget balance Total revenue
Total spending Debt
 
 Source: European Commission, AMECO October 2012. 
 
More specifically, we can observe in the 1990s and in the 2000s a higher spending-to-
GDP ratio in terms of the compensation of public employees, vis-à-vis the EU15 average. 
That ratio in Portugal trended upwards after 1986, and stayed above the EU15 average all 
through the 1990s, being only reversed after 2005 (see Figure 4). However, part of the 
reversion in 2003 is due to the fact that several hospitals were given the status of 
enterprises, and exited the general government sector, implying the reduction in the number 
of employees and in the overall wage bill. 
In practice, in Portugal there have been recurrent difficulties related to primary 
expenditure control, either due to misguided fiscal policy decisions, fiscal pro-cyclicality, 
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or the inability of a firm reigning in of general government spending.4 In fact, the necessary 
increase of some social spending that was undertaken, is not the issue, but rather the lack of 
more structurally growth enhancing policies such as well targeted education spending.  
For instance, it is true that public investment in infrastructure in the past has delivered 
positive macroeconomic rates of returns (see Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2009, who assess the 
period 1981-2005 in the case of Portugal). However, there are limits to how much physical 
infrastructure a country needs, notably financed with public funds, while the eventual 
crowding in effects of public investment will also diminish. 
 















































            Source: European Commission, AMECO, October 2012. 
 
Additionally, Afonso, Claeys and Sousa (2011) find evidence of budget deficit bias in 
Portugal, with recurrent tax reversals making the budget balance rather pro-cyclical. On the 
other hand, periods of more robust economic growth have typically been used to relax tax 
pressure, notably especially during elections. Moreover, one-off measures have been 
preferred over structural measures to contain the budget deficit during economic crises, 
                                                            
4 According to Afonso and Claeys (2008), the main reasons for the three initial breaches of the SGP in 2002 
and 2003 seem to be expenditure rises in France and Portugal, while large revenue reductions unmatched by 
expenditure cuts in Germany pushed the deficit beyond 3% of GDP.  
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particularly also to fulfil the SGP requirements.5 Interestingly, they also identify a fiscal 
regime shift in 1988 for Portugal, whereupon fiscal policy changes from being rather more 
active and a-cyclical to slightly more passive and pro-cyclical thereafter. Unfortunately, 
that mitigated change was not strong enough to ensure fiscal sustainability. 
Therefore, as a result of past trends in fiscal policies in Portugal, it is not surprising that 
almost all existing studies regarding the sustainability of public finances recurrently have 
placed Portugal in the category of the countries that lack fiscal sustainability, notably 
flagging the absence of cointegration between government spending and revenues (see, for 
instance, Afonso, 2005, Marinheiro, 2006, Afonso and Rault, 2010, and Afonso and Jalles, 
2012). More specifically, Afonso and Sousa (2011a) also report that Portugal’s fiscal 
position has significantly deteriorated over the period 1978:1-2007:4, reflecting the high 
persistence of government spending. In fact, the higher persistence of government spending 
relative to government revenue has been the major determinant of the fiscal deterioration 
over that period. 
Even though government spending trended upwards in the 1990s-2000s in Portugal, 
existing evidence shows that some room for improvement is available regarding what each 
euro spent has provided in terms of public services. According to Afonso, Schuknecht, and 
Tanzi (2005), and with data for OECD countries for the decade ended in 2000, Portugal 
should have been able, theoretically, to attain the same level of output in public services, 
using only around 80% of the inputs (total government spending) that were effectively 
used. On the other hand, and from an output perspective that study reports that with the 
same level of resources, the level of output might have been around 30% higher. Such 
quality issues have not been too present in the debate, even though countries in the EU are 
                                                            
5 In 2004 there were transfers from state-owned enterprises (Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Navegação Aérea de 
Portugal, Aeroportos de Portugal, and Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda) to CGA (civil servants pension 
system) as counterpart for the assumption by the general government of future pension liabilities of the 
employees of those enterprises. In 2003 there was the securitization of tax credits, which were sold to a 
resident non-monetary financial institution (comprising taxes and social contributions concerning the period 1 
January 1993 to 30 September 2003), and transfers from CTT (Portuguese postal operator) to CGA and to the 
Treasury, in exchange of the future payment of pensions. In 2002, took place an extraordinary settlement of 
tax arrears programme (a tax amnesty), the sale of the fixed telecommunications network, and the sale of 
rights to reintroduce tolls in a highway. Also other countries used temporary measures: Belgium (transfers in 
2003 from Belgacom to the general government in exchange for future payment of pensions); and Italy 
(securitization operation in 2002), while the regularization of tax debts was also implemented in Ireland in 
2002, Greece in 2002 and in 2003, and Italy in 2003. 
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asked to report some related information in their respective Stability and Convergence 
Programmes. 
Another stylised observation can be offered regarding the rising trends of both the 
general government debt ratio and the unemployment rate (see Figure 5). Without dwelling 
on any causality, it is still interesting to wonder to what extent there might have been some 
crowding out of financing in private activities, due to the increasing financing needs of the 
government, and whether that has been relevant for employment creation. This is a thought 
for further analysis, possibly exploring the existence of crowding out effects in the 
financing conditions in the economy.  
 
Figure 5 – Debt-to-GDP ratio and unemployment rate in Portugal (2000-2013) 
 
           Source: European Commission, AMECO, October 2012. 
 
For instance, Afonso and Jalles (2013) find that the growth impact of a 10 percentage 
points increase in the debt ratio is -0.2% (0.1%) respectively for countries with debt ratios 
above (below) 90% (30%), and they derive an endogenous debt ratio threshold of 58% for 
the euro area implying that above that level government debt is detrimental to growth. 
 
2.2. Fiscal contractions and expansions 
In order to assess the past stance of fiscal policy in Portugal, we looked at the change 
in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (CAPB) as a percentage of GDP, a widely 























































































































along the lines of Afonso (2010), we define, in a simplified way, the occurrence of a fiscal 
episode when the change in the CAPB is at least one standard deviation in a given year (we 
consider here the standard deviation of the full time series used for Portugal, 1970-2011).  
Table 1 reports the fiscal episodes, contractions and expansions, uncovered with the 
above mentioned approach. It is possible to see that in the period 1970-2011, there were 
four episodes of fiscal expansion, and six episodes of fiscal contraction. The fiscal 
expansions in 1993 and the more recent ones in 2005 and 2009 seem now to be 
counterproductive given the continuing worsening of fiscal imbalances.  
 
Table 1 – Fiscal episodes in Portugal, 1970-2011 



















1977 0   1 3.85 +6.4 
1978 1 -4.32 +0.7 0   
1983 0   1 3.08 +11.6 
1986 0   1 2.42 -2.8 
1988 0   1 2.32 +0.6 
1992 0   1 2.64 +7.3 
1993 1 -2.48 +4.6 0   
2005 1 -2.55 +5.7 0   
2009 1 -5.43 +24.7 0   
2011 0   1 7.02 +9.4 
Total episodes 4   6   
 
Source: Data, European Commission, AMECO, October 2012; plus own calculations.  - standard deviation 
of the cyclically adjusted primary balance.  
1/ Change in the debt ratio (percentage points) two years after the fiscal episode = Dt+2-Dt. 
 
However, if one observes the development of the government debt-to-GDP ratio after 
those periods, as an ad-hoc way of checking the degree of success of the fiscal contractions, 
the reality shows that the debt ratio either continued to increase or had only very small 
decreases, the exception being 1986. Indeed, the change in the debt-ratio was recorded at 
+6.4, +11.8, -2.8, +0.6, +7.3, and +9.4 percentage points, respectively two years after the 
contractionary fiscal stance was pursued in 1977, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1992 and 2011 
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(forecast).6 To illustrate further the difficulties plaguing public finances in 2011, suffices to 
notice that there is no memory in Portugal of a fiscal contraction of the size of the one 
measured by the improvement of the CAPB in 2011, and in spite of that adjustment, two 
years after that fiscal contraction the debt ratio is still increasing. 
Moreover, between 1989 and 2006 the Government obtained significant revenues from 
privatisations, and around 12.8% of which were used for government debt redemptions. 
Therefore, such historical lack of success in fiscal consolidations essentially contributed to 
compound the existence of fiscal sustainability problems. 
More specifically, and since more recently, the 2009 expansion is rather paradigmatic 
of a mistaken assessment about whether Portugal could have had an expansionary fiscal 
policy in that period. That was actually less warranted, even if there was a somewhat 
unclear EC policy assessment and issuing of guidelines at the time.  
Indeed, we may recall that the EC asked for a so-called TTT (timely, targeted, 
temporary) fiscal impulse, as reported on November 2008 notably in the European 
Economic Recovery Plan. Such short-term TTT budgetary impulse would amount to EUR 
200 billion (1.5% of EU GDP), supported by the Member States (EUR 170 billion, 1.2% of 
EU GDP), and by the EU and the European Investment Bank (EUR 30 billion (0.3% of EU 
GDP). The problem was that one year after, the EC called for a fiscal contraction. But the 
fiscal stance in Portugal in 2009 (again measured by the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance) was strongly expansionary by around 5% of GDP. And once the “order” to spend 
was given, the reversal of the process proved to be impossible in a contemporaneous 
fashion. In practice, discretionary fiscal policy was favoured instead of allowing for only 
the operation of the automatic fiscal stabilisers. 
In retrospective, and to be fair, one may argue that the “license to spend”, issued by the 
EC, was not for everybody, and just for the countries that had sufficient fiscal leeway at the 
time. Again, an illustration of the pitfalls of implementing fiscal policies in a financially 
                                                            
6 The Portuguese Escudo effective exchange rate faced a devaluation of 17 and 23 per cent respectively in 
1982 and 1983, while Portugal undertook an IMF stabilisation programme. Additionally, in 1986 occurred the 
effective introduction of VAT, and Portugal started receiving European funds. 
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constrained environment, coupled with some political cycle looming alongside economic 
policy decisions (in fact, there were parliamentary elections in Portugal in 2009).7 
 
3. The fiscal débacle  
3.1. The pressure in the capital markets 
The unstoppable vicious circle of rising long-term government bond yields and 
sovereign downgrades, that preceded the request for financial support in 2011, is illustrated 
in Figure 6. Indeed, subsequent packages of fiscal measures in 2010 and in 2011 went 
alongside the successive downgrades from the three main rating agencies. In fact, the 
collage of measures, under some pressure, has in the end come short of what was needed to 
convincingly solve the lack of trust exhibited by capital markets. Moreover, the fact that the 
sovereign rating downgrades continued to occur, even after the May 2011 bailout also fed 
into the rising of the yields (see next section).  
 
Figure 6 – 10-year government bond yield and ratings (3 Aug 2009 – 15 Apr 2011) 
 
Notes: daily yields from Reuters. PS – Socialist Party; PR – President of the Republic; PM – Prime Minister; 
M – Moody’s; S&P – Standard and Poors; F – Fitch. 
 
                                                            
7 See Figure A1 in the Appendix for the time plot of parliamentary elections together with the fiscal stance in 
Portugal as measured by the CAPB. A moderate negative correlation (-0.22) emerges signalling a more lax 

































































































































































































































































































In the context of such, even if excessive, process of downgrades and overall rising 
yields in the euro area periphery, notably in the aftermath of the 15th September 2008 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (see Figure 7) little room for manoeuvre was left for the 
authorities, which essentially could find only short-term financing in the markets via 
Treasury Bills.8 Therefore, in the second quarter of 2012, one year after the bailout, 
Portuguese sovereign debt was still rated with junk status (see euro area country ratings in 
the Appendix).  
 




On the other hand, less accurate fiscal and macro forecasts are also not welcomed by 
capital markets. For instance, Afonso and Nunes (2012) find that in the case of Portugal, 
corrections in EC forecasts for government debt (t+1, t-1 and t-2), real effective exchange 
rate (t and t-2) and inflation (t and t+1) have a significant impact on the 10-year sovereign 
yields. 
Again, and to be a bit fairer with the policy makers, we have witnessed that before the 
starting of the global credit crunch, essentially pinpointed in the literature by the first large 
                                                            
8 See Afonso and Gomes (2011) for an assessment of how some under rating in the sovereign bond market 
may have occurred in that period, notably for Portugal and for other countries as well. Additionally, Afonso, 
Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) uncover some potential speculative mispricing in sovereign bond prices in 
that period. 
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ECB emergency loan provided to European banks in response to increasing pressures in the 
interbank market on 9 July 2007, yields spreads were essentially similar and small across 
the euro area. Therefore, capital markets have been either not pricing or mispricing the 
developments of fiscal variables in many euro area countries before that period.9 In fact, we 
have observed an amazingly constant flatness of most 10-year sovereign yields even until 
2008 (see again Figure 7).  
 
3.2. The bailout 
On April 2011, Portugal asked for the financial support of the EU and of the IMF, 
signing a MEFP. The Economic Adjustment Program for Portugal covers the financing 
needs of the General Government from mid-2011 to mid-2014, amounting to EUR 78 
billion, including also EUR 12 billion for banking recapitalization. The disbursements are 
subject to quarterly assessments, and the MEFP requires a strong consolidation of public 
finances and covers also structural reforms. One can recall that at the time Portugal was 
already undergoing an EDP, launched in 2009, with 2014 as the deadline for the correction 
of the excessive deficit. Such deadline was afterwards postponed in the context of the 
agreements with the EU and the IMF.10  
In practice, the overall euro area context was such that in 2010-2011, Greece, Portugal, 
and Ireland all asked for international financial support. The financial rescue packages were 
organised by the EU, the European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF), the European 
Central Bank (ECB), and the IMF. A second loan was agreed for Greece in 2011, involving 
a haircut of privately-held debt. In addition, during 2012 Italian and Spanish bonds have 
come also under significant pressure.  
Other features that underpinned somewhat the fiscal débacle were both the revisions to 
past budget deficit and government debt data, stemming from the change in the perimeter 
of the general government, and the lack of adherence of some official fiscal forecasts. If the 
first feature could be seen to some extent exogenous to the Members States of the EU, and 
                                                            
9 See Afonso, Arghyrou, and Kontonikas (2012). 
10 See the EC site for a chronology of the Excessive Deficit Procedures for Portugal: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/portugal_en.htm  
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therefore to Portugal, the second feature has been a problem notably in several European 
countries, with different degrees of acuity.  
For instance, Afonso and Silva (2012), looking at Portuguese official forecasts for the 
period 1977-2011, report evidence of unfavourable errors regarding the budget balance in 
most years, which have been offset in some cases (totally or partially) by a favourable 
nominal GDP effect deviation. Therefore, in an already difficult international context, the 
credibility of fiscal and macro forecasts, plagued with successive unfavourable revisions, 
when based on less realistic assumptions, may also have had an unwarranted effect in the 
perceptions developed by capital markets. 
Moreover, and in order to implement a fiscal adjustment with some magnitude, already 
in the period 2011-2012, the authorities used again one-off measures, reviving the 2002-
2004 experiences. For instance, in 2011 additional revenues were obtained from the transfer 
of assets from pension funds of several financial institutions as well as extraordinary 
revenue from a personal income tax surcharge. Such one-off measures amounted to 4% of 
GDP in 2011 and 1.2% of GDP in 2012 (see Banco de Portugal, 2012).  
In the context of the implementation of a financial assistance programme, the 
authorities tend to struggle to follow ad-hoc rules of thumb such as for a 1/3, 2/3 share of 
fiscal adjustment, respectively via the revenues and the spending side. Those fiscal austerity 
strategies, given that the feedback effect on growth is not easy to forecast, are usually 
fraught with difficulties regarding their success, and the outcomes tend to be uncertain.11  
For the purpose of illustrating the effects of rising interest rates on general government 
debt interest payments, the change in interest payments can be decomposed into three 
effects: i) an effect stemming from changes in government debt (a so-called quantity 
effect), ii) an effect resulting from changes in interest rates (a so-called price effect), and 
iii) a residual cross effect. Therefore, the change in interest payments, I, can be decomposed 
as follows: 
 
                                                            
11 Although some evidence points to the fact that expansionary fiscal policies in Portugal do not, per se, seem 




Effect via Effect via Cross effect
change in change in (residual)
debt interest rate
I B i i B B i                    (1) 
 
where B is the general government debt and i is the average implicit interest rate (I/B). 
Figure 8 shows the effect of the upward contribution from the change in interest rates 
to the overall change in interest payments in 2011 and in 2012, notably as a result of the 
difficulties in raising financing in the capital markets. Moreover, the impact on interest rate 
payments from the change in interest rates was higher in that period than the effect from the 
change in debt itself. Those developments contrast markedly with the period just before the 
financial bailout, 2009-2010, where the change in interest rates contributed to decrease the 
overall interest rate payments, while the rising stock of outstanding government debt had 
then an opposite effect. 
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It seems fair to say that in Portugal there has been in the past a lack of a clear control of 
(primary) public spending in the 1990s and in the 2000s, notably after 2008, and 
governments have used too many off-budget measures to mitigate the imbalances in the 
fiscal accounts. More recently, in 2009, fiscal policy followed an expansionary track in 
Portugal, notably after some less fortunate policy guidelines voiced by some European 
institutions.  
In addition, pro-cyclical fiscal policies have exacerbated economic instability with the 
distortionary effects of taxation becoming larger, and consequently undermining economic 
growth prospects. In practice, the operation of the automatic fiscal stabilisers was usually 
overridden by discretionary fiscal measures.  
Therefore, and in a nutshell, the 2011 financial rescue, embedded in the Economic and 
Financial Assistance Programme agreed between the national authorities and the EC, the 
ECB and the IMF, was to some extent triggered by several internal and external constraints 
and factors: 
i) own policy errors, which seem to have cut across political partisanship;12 
ii) strong general government primary spending persistence; 
iii) the use of extraordinary or one-off fiscal measures, instead of more structural 
fiscal adjustment measures; 
iv) some recurrent pitfalls in fiscal forecasting (both at the national and at the EU 
institutions level); 
v) an exogenous hostile environment in capital markets, notably after the 
sovereign debt crisis that materialised after 2009.  
 
In retrospective, we can see the 2010 SGP as a lost opportunity, at the time, to clearly 
flag to the markets an encompassing package of credible and well thought fiscal 
consolidation measures. Indeed, several studies have pointed at length that fiscal 
developments do matter for the setting of sovereign debt ratings by the rating agencies, and 
                                                            
12 In the Appendix, Table A2, we list the Ministers of Finance and the budget balance and debt ratios, 
showing some lax fiscal developments across political colours.  
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for the perception of investors about the default risk of a sovereign.13 In the end, more strict 
measures were then adopted one year after, under much less friendly market conditions, 
and to some extent, imposed by the institutions that provided the financial support to 
Portugal. 
On the other hand, the experiences, notably in the period 2002-2004 (and in the period 
2011-2012), of using temporary solutions to reduce fiscal imbalances, have proved to be 
short lived in their effects. Therefore, policy decisions that favour such one-off measures 
seem less likely to ensure a long-term adjustment of the fiscal position of a country. 
Additionally, the future spending responsibilities stemming from public-private 
partnerships that have been implemented in Portugal, and eventually also related to state-
owned enterprises, seem to pose relevant risks for public finances, not yet fully chartered. 
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Source: European Commission, AMECO, October 2012. Vertical lines denote parliamentary 
elections (Portuguese Parliament). 
 
Table A1 – Sovereign credit ratings for euro area countries (17 May 2012) 
Ratings Characterization 
of debt and issuer S&P Countries Moody’s Countries  Fitch Countries 
Highest quality AAA DE, FI, LU, NL Aaa 
AT, DE, FI,  
FR, LU, NL AAA AT, DE, FI,  FR, LU, NL 
AA+ AT, BE, FR Aa1   AA+ ES 




AA- EE Aa3 BE AA-   
A + SI A1 EE A+ EE, MT, SK 




A- MT A3 ES, IT, MT A- IT 
BBB+ ES, IE, IT Baa1   BBB+ IE 




BBB-   Baa3   BBB- CY 
BB+ CY Ba1 CY, IE BB+ PT 
BB PT Ba2   BB   
 
Likely to fulfil 
obligations 
BB-   Ba3 PT BB-   
B+   B1   B+   
B   B2   B   
 
High credit risk 
B-   B3   B- GR 
Very high credit risk CCC GR Caa1   CCC   
Default     C GR C   
Source: S&P, Moody’s, Fitch. 
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Table A2 – Budget balance and government debt, % of GDP; Prime Ministers and Finance 
Ministers in Portugal (Constitutional governments) 









23-07-1976 Henrique Medina Carreira  Mário Soares  PS 1976 -5.1 25.9 
1977   PS-CDS 1977 -3.8 27.3 
30-01-1978 Vitor Constâncio  PS 1978 -5.7 29.9 
29-08-1978 José da Silva Lopes Alfredo Nobre da Costa Independent    
22-11-1978 Manuel Jacinto Nunes Carlos Mota Pinto Independent    
01-08-1979 António Sousa Franco   Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo Independent 1979 -5.3 33.8 
03-01-1980 
 
Aníbal Cavaco Silva 
 
Francisco Sá Carneiro/Diogo 









09-01-1981 João António Morais Leitão Francisco Pinto Balsemão PSD-CDS 1981 -11.7 39.0 
04-09-1981 João Salgueiro  PSD-CDS    
1982   PSD-CDS 1982 -7.9 41.8 
09-06-1983 Ernâni Rodrigues Lopes Mário Soares  PS-PSD 1983 -6.4 46.7 
1984   PSD 1984 -9.7 51.4 
06-11-1985 Miguel Cadilhe   Aníbal Cavaco Silva PSD 1985 -9.6 58.4 
1986   PSD 1986 -5.4 57.3 
17-08-1987 Miguel Cadilhe  Aníbal Cavaco Silva PSD 1987 -5.1 55.2 
1988   PSD 1988 -3.2 54.7 
1989   PSD 1989 -2.2 53.6 
04-01-1990 Luís Miguel Beleza   PSD 1990 -4.7 55.3 
31-10-1991 Jorge Braga de Macedo  Aníbal Cavaco Silva PSD 1991 -7.0 55.7 
1992   PSD 1992 -4.4 50.0 
07-12-1993 Eduardo Almeida Catroga    PSD 1993 -7.5 54.6 
1994   PSD 1994 -7.1 57.3 
28-10-1995 António Sousa Franco   António Guterres PS 1995 -5.0 59.2 
1996   PS 1996 -4.5 58.3 
1997   PS 1997 -3.4 54.4 
1998   PS 1998 -3.5 50.4 
25-10-1999 Joaquim Pina Moura   António Guterres PS 1999 -2.7 49.6 
2000   PS 2000 -3.3 48.4 
03-07-2001 Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins   PS 2001 -4.8 51.1 
06-04-2002 Manuela Ferreira Leite   Durão Barroso PSD-CDS/PP 2002 -3.4 53.7 
2003   PSD-CDS/PP 2003 -3.7 55.7 
17-07-2004 António Bagão Félix   Pedro Santana Lopes PSD-CDS/PP 2004 -4.0 57.5 
12-03-2005 Luís Campos e Cunha  José Sócrates PS 2005 -6.5 62.5 
21-07-2005 Fernando Teixeira dos Santos    PS    
2006   PS 2006 -4.6 63.7 
2007   PS 2007 -3.2 68.3 
2008   PS 2008 -3.7 71.6 
26-10-2009 Fernando Teixeira dos Santos   José Sócrates PS 2009 -10.2 83.1 
2010   PS 2010 -9.8 93.3 
21-06-2011 Vitor Gaspar Pedros Passos Coelho PSD-CDS/PP 2011 -4.2 107.8 
2012   PSD-CDS/PP 2012 -4.7 113.9 
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO, October 2012; and Portuguese Parliament. PS – Socialist Party; 
PSD – Social Democratic Party; CDS – Social Democratic Centre; CDS/PP – Social Democratic 
Centre/Popular Party. 
